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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is vested in this Court pursuant to Const, of Utah Art. VIII
Sec. 3, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3). This Court accepted jurisdiction on
an interlocutory appeal on November 28, 2001 pursuant to Utah R.App.P.
Rule 5(c).
Plaintiffs have concurred with the Court's jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
Was Defendant Ross within the course and scope of her employment,
thereby rendering the City vicariously liable, when she was involved in an
automobile accident with Plaintiffs:
1) while in Tooele County, outside of Salt Lake City's municipal
boundaries;
2) while she was off duty;
3) while performing no police function;
4) while driving to her home, with her one year old child;
5) in a City police car that she, in her sole discretion, chose to drive?
This issue was preserved in the trial court by Plaintiffs' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and the City's Motion for Summary Judgment.
See Record 59-60 and 69-70. The preservation of such issue is
demonstrated by the trial court's Memorandum Decision dated September

17, 2001, see Record 142-148 and the trial court's Order dated October 2,
2001, entering Partial Summary Judgment to Plaintiffs and denying the
City's Motion for Summary Judgment, see Record 149-151.

RELEVANT STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
The following statutes have relevance to the City's argument and are
reprinted in toto, in Addendum 3, attached hereto: 10-3-914, 53-13-103 and
77-9-3.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
While returning home after attending a meeting at her work, Ms.
Ross, a Salt Lake City police officer, was involved in an accident with the
Plaintiffs in Tooele County. At the time of the accident, Ms. Ross had
chosen to drive a Salt Lake City police vehicle and was also transporting her
one-year old son. The Plaintiffs' claim that Salt Lake City is vicariously
liable for Ms. Ross's conduct.
Salt Lake City contends that Ms. Ross was not within the scope of her
employment and cannot meet the test set forth in Birkner v. Salt Lake
County, 111 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989). The trial court made no effort to apply
this test.
In addition, the parties agree that the general rule is that an employee
is not acting within the course and scope of her employment when the

2

employee is going to or from home to work (the "coming and going" rule).
Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., 801 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah
1989). However, Plaintiffs argue that there are two exceptions to that rule:
1) the "special errand" exception; and 2) the "employer provided
transportation" exception. The trial court found that the second of these
applied, concluded that Ms. Ross was within the course and scope of her
employment and granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
on the issue of vicarious liability and denied the City's Motion for Summary
Judgment. The trial court did not rule on the "special errand" exception.
The trial court held that a police officer "is essentially always on duty, at
least when operating a police vehicle." Salt Lake City contends that the trial
court applied the wrong test, ignored the clear case law to the contrary and
reached the wrong conclusion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Defendant Michelle Ross is employed as a Salt Lake City

police officer. Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 63.
2.

Ms. Ross lives in Tooele, Utah. Deposition of Michelle Ross,

3.

Ms. Ross requested to be assigned as a Field Training Officer

R. 63.

("FTO"). Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 125.
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4.

On the day of the accident giving rise to this lawsuit, Ms. Ross

was returning to Tooele in her police car after attending a FTO meeting in
Salt Lake City on a day she otherwise would not have worked. Deposition
of Michelle Ross, R. 63.
5.

The FTO meetings were regularly scheduled every three weeks.

Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 72.
6.

Ms. Ross is paid for three hours to attend the FTO meetings

even if the meeting goes less than three hours. Deposition of Michelle Ross,
R. 63.
7.

If the FTO meeting went longer than three hours, Ms. Ross

would be paid for the actual length of the meeting. Deposition of Michelle
Ross, R. 72.
8.

The calculation of the time would be made from the start of the

meeting to the end of the meeting. Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 72.
9.

Ms. Ross commutes to and from work in a Salt Lake City

owned police car pursuant to the City's "take home car program."
Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 63.
10.

Ms. Ross's use of the vehicle is limited by regulation to

traveling to and from work and other "official business." Deposition of
Michelle Ross, R. 63.
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11.

It is Ms. Ross's choice to participate in the take-home car

program. Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 125.
12.

Salt Lake City does not require Ms. Ross to use a City vehicle

to drive to and from work. Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 73.
13.

Ms. Ross could use her personal vehicle to go to and from work

if she chose. Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 73.
14.

The choice to use a City vehicle is totally Ms. Ross's.

Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 73.
15.

Ms. Ross pays for the use of the City vehicle. Deposition of

Michelle Ross, R. 73.
16.

Ms. Ross is not compensated for her travel to and from work.

Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 72.
17.

Ms. Ross is not provided mileage for her travel to and from

work. Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 72.
18.

Ms. Ross had her 1-year old son in the car with her at the time

of the accident. Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 72.
19.

Ms. Ross had her son in the police vehicle approximately 50

times when going to or from police sponsored events. Deposition of
Michelle Ross, R 73.
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20.

If Ms. Ross saw an emergency or dangerous situation while in

Tooele County and had a civilian passenger in her vehicle, under Salt Lake
City policy she is required to take that individual to a secure place away
from her vehicle before she could respond. Deposition of Michelle Ross,
R. 73.
21.

While driving the police vehicle, Ms. Ross was required to have

her police radio on throughout the drive to and from Tooele and to be
available and respond to emergency calls. Deposition of Michelle Ross,
R.63.
22.

Although Ms. Ross leaves her police radio on while in Tooele

County, there are dead spots along the way and she does not know if
dispatch can hear her. Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 74.
23.

Ms. Ross was not in uniform at the time of the accident.

Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 73.
24.

Ms. Ross has never been called out to respond from Tooele

County. Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 73.
25.

Ms. Ross has never responded to an emergency in Tooele

County. Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 74.
26.

Ms. Ross does not know how to contact Tooele County

emergency dispatch. Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 74.
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27.

Ms. Ross was not pursuing any police business at the time of

the accident and was driving home from the FTO meeting. Deposition of
Michelle Ross, R. 71.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPLY
THE BIRKNER TEST
In Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 111 P.2d 1053 (1989) the Supreme
Court established the test for "scope of employment cases: 1) the
employee's conduct must be of a general kind the employee is employed to
perform; 2) the employee's conduct must occur within the hours of the
employee's work and the ordinary spatial boundaries of the employment;
and 3) the employee's conduct must be motivated, at least in part, by the
purpose of serving her employer's interest.
Ms. Ross, who was simply driving home after work with her infant
son, had an accident in Tooele County. Her conduct does not meet the
Birkner test.

7

II.
THE "COMING AND GOING" RULE
APPLIES TO MS. ROSS'S COMMUTE
TO HER HOME IN TOOELE COUNTY
As a general rule, an employee is not acting within the course and
scope of her employment when she is going to or from work. Ms. Ross's
commute fits squarely within this rule and Salt Lake City should not be held
vicariously liable for her conduct.
In addition, Ms. Ross does not fit within either the "owner-required
transportation" or "special errand" exceptions to the "coming and going"
rule. Ms. Ross was simply driving home in a vehicle she chose to drive; she
paid the City for the privilege of driving it; she was transporting her infant
child - consequently was unavailable for duty; and the accident took place
outside the boundaries of Salt Lake City.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE
INCORRECT TEST
The trial court wholly ignored the Birkner test and the "coming and
going" rule, focusing instead solely upon the "owner-required
transportation" exception that it mischaracterized as the "owner-provided
transportation" exception.

8

The trial court ignored all relevant Utah case law, instead adopting a
New Mexico case that relied upon facts and law in diametric contradiction to
the facts of this case and the law of the State of Utah.
The trial court performed almost no evaluation of the underlying facts
nor the respective benefits of the City and Ms. Ross.
The trial court's result is contrary to the clear and consistent rulings of
the appellate courts of this State.
ARGUMENT
The trial court, after considering the uncontested facts in this matter,
and the arguments of counsel, concluded that a police officer "is essentially
always on duty, at least when operating a police vehicle." (Memorandum
Decision, p. 5 attached hereto as Addendum l.1) Based thereon, the trial
court imposed respondeat superior liability upon Salt Lake City. To support
its ruling the trial court fashioned this all-encompassing rule of law in spite
of this Court's consistent holding that "[s]cope of employment issues are in
general highly fact-dependent. Indeed, our prior case law recognizes that
'whether or not the injury arises out of or within the scope of employment
depends upon the particular facts of each case.'" Drake v. Industrial

1

On the 2 day of October, 2001 the trial court entered its Order granting
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and denying the City's
Motion for Summary Judgment consistent with the Memorandum Decision.
9

Commission of Utah, 939 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1977) citing State Tax
Commission v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah
1984).
Indeed, this Court has been reluctant "to formulate and impose a factspecific rule of law because of the likelihood that no rule can be formulated
that will adequately address all potential facts in these cases." Drake, 939
P.2d at 182. Nonetheless, the trial court did precisely what this Court has
declined to do. In addition, rather than applying the proper tests for scope
of employment previously promulgated by this Court, the trial court
fashioned its own hybrid test and did not take into account the specific facts
of this matter.
This Court has fashioned two distinct "scope of employment" tests: 1)
the Birkner test ; and 2) the "coming and going" test. In arriving at its
decision, the trial court acknowledged these tests, made no effort to apply
Birkner, misapplied the "coming and going" test and ended up with a rule of
law that defies the reasoning behind either of the recognized tests. The City
is unaware of any guiding case that has attempted to reconcile these two
tests but, under either, the trial court's conclusion was erroneous.

2

Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 111 P.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Utah 1989).
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I.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO
APPLY THE BIRKNER TEST
The result reached by the trial court reflects a disregard for the scope
of employment test set forth in Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 111 P.2d 1053,
1056-1057 (Utah 1989).3 Therein, this Court detailed the criteria requisite to
a finding of scope of employment: (1) an employee's conduct must be of a
general kind the employee is employed to perform; (2) the employee's
conduct must occur within the hours of the employee's work and the
ordinary spatial boundaries of the employment; and (3) the employee's
conduct must be motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving her
employer's interest.4

This Court has repeatedly expressed its support for the Birkner test. See
Clark v. Pangan, 2000 UT 37125, 998 P.2d 268; Crissman v. Hallows,
2000 UT App. 104123, 999 P.2d 1249, 1251; Wilson v. Valley Mental
Health, 969 P.2d 416, 420 (Utah 1998); Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, 944 P.2d
327, n. 1 (Utah 1997); Glover v. Boy Scouts of America, 923 P.2d 1383,
1385 (Utah 1996); Kunz v. Beneficial Temporaries, 921 P.2d 456, n. 9 (Utah
1996); Jackson v. Righter, 891 P.2d 1387, 1391 (Utah 1995); Christensen v.
Swenson, 874 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah 1994); S.H v. State of Utah, 865 P.2d
1363, 1366 (Utah 1993); J.H v. West Valley City 840 P.2d 115, fn 25 (Utah
1992); Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light, 823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991);
Hodges v. Gibson Products, 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991); and Clover v.
Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah 1991).
4

In applying the Birkner test, the Court of Appeals further indicated that "an
employee who fails to meet any one of these three factors is outside the
scope of employment and the employer cannot be held liable under the
11

Applying this test to the specific facts in this matter results in
conclusion contrary to that reached by the trial court.
A.
MS. ROSS WAS NOT PERFORMING ANY
WORK FOR WHICH SHE WAS HIRED.
Under the first prong of the Birkner test, an employee's conduct must
be of a general kind the employee is employed to perform. Birkner, 111
P.2d at 1056-57. "In other words, the employee must be about the
employer's business and the duties assigned by the employer." Birkner, 111
P.2d at 1057. A review of the facts herein results in a clear conclusion that
Ms. Ross was not within the parameters of that prong.
At the time of the accident, Ms. Ross was doing nothing more than
driving home from a work-related meeting. {See Fact No. 4.) Although she
was paid for her time at the meeting {see Fact No. 6), she was not paid for
her time traveling to and from work {see Fact No. 16) nor was she provided
mileage for her travel to and from work {see Fact No. 17).
At the time of the accident, Ms. Ross was transporting her 1-year old
son {see Fact No. 18) and was incapable of immediately responding to an
emergency or dangerous situation. {See Fact No. 20.)
doctrine ofrespondeat superior"" Christensen v. Burns, 844 P.2d 992, 994
(Utah App. 1992) reversed on other grounds Christensen v. Swenson, 874
P.2d 125 (Utah 1994).
12

The City does not require Ms. Ross to use the City police vehicle for
her commute. (See Fact No. 12.) It was Ms. Ross's choice to use the City
vehicle (see Fact Nos. 11 and 14) and she could have used her personal
vehicle if she chose. (See Fact No. 13.) Ms. Ross pays the City for the right
to use the City vehicle. (See Fact No. 15.) There can be no doubt that Ms.
Ross was employed to perform police work within Salt Lake City not to
commute to and from Tooele County with her infant child.
Applying these facts to the first prong of the Birkner test makes
certain conclusions self-evident, i.e., Ms. Ross was not employed nor
compensated to drive a vehicle, City-owned or personal, to and from work;
she was not paid to be in Tooele County; she was not paid to be transporting
her child. She was not, in her own words, pursuing any police business.
(See Fact No. 27).
The trial court's Memorandum Decision is devoid of any assessment
of this prong and such failure was fatal to its conclusion. The proper
application of the uncontroverted facts to this prong clearly leads to the
inescapable conclusion that Ms. Ross's conduct was not related to the type
of work she was employed to perform. Just as clearly, Ms. Ross was not
assigned any duties by Salt Lake City and was not performing any duties on
behalf of Salt Lake City at the time and place of the accident.
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B.
MS. ROSS'S CONDUCT WAS NOT WITHIN
THE HOURS OF HER EMPLOYMENT NOR
WITHIN THE SPATIAL BOUNDARIES
OF HER EMPLOYMENT
In order to satisfy the second prong of Birkner, Ms. Ross's conduct
must have occurred during the hours of her employment. Birkner, 111 P.2d
at 1057. It is uncontested that she was not on the City's payroll at the time of
the accident and was not compensated for her commute time. {See Facts
Nos. 4 and 16.) There simply is not a scintilla of evidence that sustains a
conclusion that Ms. Ross was within the hours of her employment.
Similarly, the facts do not support a conclusion that she was within
the ordinary spatial boundaries of her employment as required by Birkner.
Birkner, 111 P.2d at 1057. At the time of the accident, Ms. Ross was not
within the municipal limits of Salt Lake City or even Salt Lake County - but
was within the boundaries of Tooele County. The trial court did not take
such facts into account and when these facts are taken into account, no
reasonable person could conclude that Ms. Ross was within the spatial
confines of her employment.
There may be those who suggest that a police officer has statewide
law enforcement capability and accordingly, territorial boundaries are
irrelevant. The statutory law of this state, however, leads to a much more
14

restrictive conclusion. For instance, a Salt Lake City police officer has law
enforcement authority "[wjithin the boundaries of the municipality." Utah
Code Ann. § 10-3-914(1).
While a police officer may have statewide authority under certain
circumstances, such circumstances do not apply to his instant matter. The
Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit, Utah Code Ann. § 53-13-103(3)(a), provides:
(3)(a) A law enforcement officer has statewide
full-spectrum peace officer authority, but the
authority extends to other counties, cities, or towns
only when the officer is acting under Title 77,
Chapter 9, Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit, unless
the law enforcement officer is employed by the
state.
(Emphasis added.)
Correspondingly, Utah Code Ann. § 77-9-3 provides that an officer
may only act beyond his "normal jurisdiction" (a) when in fresh pursuit; (b)
when a public offense is committed in the officers presence; (c) when
participating in an investigation that originated in the officer's normal
jurisdiction in cooperation with the local authority; or (d) when called to
assist a local officer.5

5

In addition, if possible, an officer should notify and receive approval from
the local law enforcement agency before taking action. Ms. Ross testified
that she did not know how to contact the local law enforcement agency. (See
Fact No. 26.)

15

Ms. Ross was clearly not acting pursuant to the Uniform Act because
she was not performing any of the four required police functions. In fact,
she was not pursuing any police business at the time of the accident. (See
Fact No. 27.) Nor was she in any "standby" position. As previously noted,
Ms. Ross had her 1-year old son in the car and could not respond to a
dangerous or emergency condition. (See Fact No. 20.) Ms. Ross did not
know if there could be communications with Salt Lake City Police
Department dispatch because there were "dead spots" that made her police
radio not work. (See Fact No. 22.)6 Accordingly, Ms. Ross was not
performing any employment services within the spatial boundaries of Salt
Lake City, she was not available to perform them and she was not
performing any duties under the auspices of the Uniform Act on Fresh
Pursuit. Ms. Ross was driving home from work - nothing more.
C.
MS. ROSS'S CONDUCT WAS NOT MOTIVATED
BY SALT LAKE CITY'S INTERESTS
The final prong of Birkner directs that Ms. Ross's conduct must be
motivated by the purpose of serving Salt Lake City's interests. Ms. Ross
admits that she was performing no police function at the time of the
6

In fact, Ms. Ross has never been called out by the Salt Lake City Police
Department to return to duty from Tooele County and has never responded
to an emergency in Tooele County. (See Fact Nos. 24 and 25.)
16

accident. {See Fact No. 27.) Her sole and singular conduct was driving
home, with her son, to Tooele County. The City's interests were not, in any
regard, advanced by this conduct.
In Whiteheadv. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., 801 P.2d 934,
937 (Utah 1989), this Court found that the employer "had no control over
[the employee's] decision to commute to and from work, the route he chose,
or the manner in which he drove his automobile." The Court ruled that the
employee was outside of his scope of employment. Similarly, Salt Lake
City had no control over Ms. Ross's commute.

The facts are that Ms. Ross

chose to drive a City vehicle; Ms. Ross chose the route she drove; and Ms.
Ross controlled her driving, all without any input or control from the City.
In addition, the Whitehead Court found that a "useful test [regarding
the scope of employment] is whether the trip is one which would have
required the employer to send another employee over the same route or to
perform the same function if the trip had not been made." Whitehead, 801
P.2d at 937. Clearly, Salt Lake City had no interest in having a Salt Lake
City police officer in Tooele County at the time and location of the accident
and certainly would not have sent another police officer to Tooele County in
Ms. Ross's place.
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Just as clearly, Ms. Ross meets none of the Birkner test's prongs let
alone all of them. Ms. Ross was not in the course and scope of her
employment at the time of the accident. The trial court's conclusion,
reached without applying the Birkner test to the specific facts in this matter,
was reversible error.
II.
THE "COMING AND GOING" RULE APPLIES
TO MS. ROSS'S COMMUTE TO HER HOME
IN TOOELE COUNTY
The parties are in agreement that it is the general rule that an
employee is not acting within the course and scope of her employment when
she is going to or coming from work.7 Whitehead, 801 P.2d at 935. It is
equally uncontested that Ms. Ross was on her way home from work. {See
Fact No. 4.)
The "coming and going" rule "arose because, 'in most instances, such
an injury is suffered as a consequence of risks and hazards to which all
members of the traveling public are subject rather than risks and hazards
having to do with and originating in the work or business of the employer.'"
Although this Court has not had occasion to reconcile the elements of the
Birkner test with those of the "coming and going" rule, the City respectfully
submits that, in a negligence context, they are functionally equivalent - that
is, the "coming and going" rule is simply another way of defining the third
prong of the Birkner test.. However, even if they are distinct, Plaintiffs
cannot prevail under either.
18

Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1997). This very
principle is fully applicable to the case of Ms. Ross. She was simply a
member of the traveling public who, by her own choice, happened to be in a
police vehicle outside of her law enforcement jurisdiction.
Recognizing that there may be occasions when travel is employmentrelated, the Court has recognized the inapplicability of the "coming and
going" rule when the travel is in connection with "an act outside an
employee's regular duties which is undertaken in good faith to advance the
employer's interests." Drake, 939 P.2d at 183 citing State Tax Commission
685 P.2d at 1051. There are no facts to support a finding that Ms. Ross, in
good faith or otherwise, undertook to do anything to advance Salt Lake
City's interest while commuting in Tooele County. The interests being
advanced were simply the same as all members of the commuting public - to
get from one location to another.
This Court has succinctly defined the "coming and going" rule as:
[W]hen the employee engages in a special activity which is
within the course of employment, and which is reasonably at
the request or invitation of the employer, any injury suffered
while traveling to and from the place of such activity is also
within the course and scope of employment.
Z>dte, 939P.2dl83.
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Ms. Ross was not involved in any "special activity" let alone at the
request of Salt Lake City. She was engaged in the daily and mundane act of
returning home from work.
Similarly, "[t]he major premise of the 'going and coming' rule is that
it is unfair to impose unlimited liability on an employer for conduct of its
employees over which it has no control and from which it derives no
benefit." Whitehead, 801 P.2d at 937; Salt Lake City had no control over
Ms. Ross's decision regarding her choice of vehicles, her route or her
driving and derived no benefit from her presence at the time and place of the
accident.8
This Court has been clear that when applying the "coming and going"
rule to negligence cases, "it is fundamental that even though the employee
may not be at a regular place of work, he must be performing a duty for his
employer, or one which is so connected with his employment as to be an
essential part thereof " Lundberg, 465 P.2d at 176 (emphasis added). It is
apparent that the "coming and going" rule is applicable to Ms. Ross's
"Mere arrival at work is not considered a substantial benefit to the
employer." VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Commission, 901 P.2d 281, 285 (Utah
App. 1995) citing Lundberg v. Cream O Weber, 465 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah
1970). It was Ms. Ross's decision to live in Tooele County and when "it is
the employee's individual choice to secure remote employment, [] it does
not follow that such a decision inherently confers a benefit on one's
employer." Cross v. Industrial Commission, 824 P.2d 1202, 1206 (Utah
App. 1992).
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commute and Salt Lake City is not responsible for her conduct pursuant to
respondeat superior.
In recognition of the tenuousness of their position under their
argument, Plaintiffs attempt to avoid the results of the "coming and going"
rule by submitting that two separate and distinct exceptions apply: 1) the
"owner-provided transportation" exception and 2) the "special errand"
exception. However, applying the facts of this case to the requirements of
those exceptions, demonstrates a clear inability of Plaintiffs to successfully
place Ms. Ross within either exception.
A.
THE "OWNER-PROVIDED TRANSPORTATION"
EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY TO
MS. ROSS'S COMMUTE
The trial court apparently reached its erroneous conclusion after
relying upon the "owner provided transportation" exception to the "coming
and going" rule.9 In arguing their position, Plaintiffs mischaracterized the
"owner-required transportation" test as the "owner-provided transportation"
test. Unfortunately, the trial court ignored this important distinction as well

9

Such exception is founded in workers' compensation cases and, to date, is
unrecognized in third party negligence cases.
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as case law to the contrary. By adopting Plaintiffs' mischaracterization, the
trial court committed error.
The trial court initiated its analysis by incorrectly relying upon a quote
from State Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053
(Utah 1984),10 to wit: "the going and coming rule does not apply 'where
transportation was furnished by the employer . . .'" (See Memorandum
Decision p. 4.) Such quote was made* with reference to a previous case Kinne v. Industrial Commission 609 P.2d 926 (Utah 1980). A review of the
facts of Kinne demonstrates that the trial court's reliance on the "employer
furnished" transportation was misplaced. In Kinne, a workers'
compensation case, the claimant took his employer's vehicle home because
"it was understood that maintenance work [on the vehicle] was [claimant's]
responsibility... [and claimant had taken the vehicle] home and had
performed certain required repairs on it for the benefit of [the employer]."
Kinne 609 P.2d at 927 (emphasis added).11

The Court erroneously attributed the quote to Whitehead v. Variable
Annuity Life Insurance, 801 P.2d 934 (Utah 1989).
11

In addition, the trial court misread State Tax Commission. It is not an
"owner-provided transportation" case but, rather, a "special errand" case.
See Cross v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, 824 P.2d 1202,
1205 (Utah App. 1992).
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Consistent with those facts, the Court in State Tax Commission also
referred to Bailey v. Industrial Commission 398 P.2d 545 (Utah 1965) for
the proposition that scope of employment may be found "where the
employer requires the employee to use a vehicle as an instrumentality of the
business." State Tax Commission, 685 P.2d at 1053 (emphasis added.)
It is noteworthy that all three cases, Kinne, Bailey and State Tax
Commission were workers' compensation cases where the claimants' burden
were the beneficiaries of a presumption in their favor as opposed to a
negligence claim, such as the instant matter, where Plaintiffs have to
establish their claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

The trial court

not only failed to take such evidentiary burden-shifting into account but
failed to acknowledge the differing burdens.

Workers' Compensation cases are of little value for stare decisis purposes
inasmuch as the Workers' Compensation Act is liberally construed and
applied to provide coverage. Any doubt respecting the right of
compensation will be resolved in favor of the claimant. State Tax
Commission, 685 P.2d at 1053. In the instant matter, no such presumption
favors Plaintiffs who still bear the burden of proving the essential elements
by a preponderance of the evidence. Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional
Medical Center, 791 P.2d 193, 200 (Utah 1990). See also, Model Utah Jury
Instructions - Civil 2.18. As such, Workers' Compensation cases are
germane only as somewhat instructive; provided, if a claimant could not
prevail under the more liberal standards of Workers' Compensation cases, it
is unlikely that Plaintiffs could prevail under the more restrictive standards
of negligence law.
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A review of the workers' compensation cases dealing with this limited
exception, to the extent they are relevant to negligence cases at all,
demonstrates the error of the trial court's conclusion.
Plaintiffs, below, also relied on Bailey v. Industrial Commission, 398
P.2d 545 (Utah 1965) but such reliance was misplaced. In reaching its
conclusion that claimant was entitled to workers' compensation coverage,
the Court, in that case, found that "when an employee is required by his
employer to bring his own vehicle to the place of business for use there, the
employee is covered while going to and from work." Bailey, 398 P.2d at
546.

(Emphasis added.)
In its analysis, the Court cited and adopted Davis v. Bjorenson, 293

N.W. 829 (Iowa 1940) as controlling. The Court specifically relied upon the
following:
[I]t was [claimant's] duty and this duty was regular
and definite, to take the automobile to the
employer's shop for its use in the business, by
others as well as claimant. . . claimant had no
selection of his mode of travel to work, he was
required under the terms of his contract to drive
his own car from his home to the shop . ..
(Emphasis added.)

13

Trying to reconcile the facts in Bailey and their application to workers'
compensation coverage, the Court conceded that "the question is a close
one." Bailey, 398 P.2d at 546.
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The facts in the instant matter are considerably at odds with those
relied upon in Bailey. The testimony of Ms. Ross is most compelling
against Plaintiffs' position. Admittedly, Ms. Ross was not pursuing any
police business at the time of the accident. See Fact No. 27. Salt Lake City
did not require Ms. Ross to use a City vehicle. See Fact No. 12. Ms. Ross
could have used her own personal vehicle for her travels. See Fact Nos. 11
and 13. The decision to use a City vehicle is totally Ms. Ross's. See Fact
No. 14. Ms. Ross pays the City to use its vehicle. See Fact No. 15. Ms.
Ross was not compensated for her travel time. See Fact No. 16. Ms. Ross is
not reimbursed for mileage. See Fact No. 17.
Likewise, in State Tax Commission, 685 P.2d at 1053, the Court also
referred to the "requires the employee to use a vehicle" standard prior to
finding a course and scope of employment. See also, Windsor Insurance v.
American States Insurance, 2001 UT App. 98 f 13, 418 Utah Adv. Rep. 13.
("[The employer] did not require [driver] to take her vehicle.") (Emphasis
added.) See also, Whitehead, 801 P.2d at 936-37 ("it was the regular and
definite duty to take the automobile"). (Emphasis added.) See also,
VanLeewen, 901 P.2d at 285 ("[Employer] did not require [Employee] to
perform any job-related service or use the vehicle as a business
instrumentality while traveling to and from work") (Emphasis added).
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In further support of their argument, Plaintiffs also submitted for the
trial court's consideration, cases from Nevada and New York. However,
even Plaintiffs' Nevada case Tighe v. Las Vegas Metro Police Dep % 877
P.2d 1032, 1035 (Nev. 1994) recognizes: "Today's ruling is not sufficiently
broad and all-inclusive to justify the conclusion that all law enforcement
officers are always excluded from [the coming and going] rule . .."
(Emphasis in original.) Plaintiffs argued in favor of just such a "broad and
all-inclusive" result and the trial court acceded to that argument.
Plaintiffs' foreign cases, however, do not aid their position. The
broad language relied upon by Plaintiffs in their New York case, Collier v.
County of Nassau, 362 N.Y.S.2d 52 (Supreme Court Appellate Division
1974) was significantly curtailed in DeJesus v. New York State Police, 467
N.Y.S.2d 916, 917 (Supreme Court Appellate Division 1983) when the
Court, after reviewing Collier, held: "[Claimant had completed his tour of
duty, changed from his uniform to civilian dress, checked out of the police
barracks and operated his private automobile outside the geographical area
of his assigned employment before the happening of the accident."
(Emphasis added). Inasmuch as Ms. Ross was off-duty, out of uniform and
out of her geographical jurisdiction, DeJesus is much more factually similar
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to the current matter than is Collier and, in DeJesus, the Court refused to
find scope and course of employment.14
Further, Plaintiffs' citations from other states do not represent a
consistent position throughout the states. For instance, in Koscelek v. Lucas,
43 A.2d 550, 551-52 (Pa. 1945), the Pennsylvania Court reviewed a
negligence claim against Allegheny County. In that case, a county police
officer was off-duty and driving home. During his drive, he observed what
appeared to be an automobile accident. He stopped his car to investigate,
backed up and hit and injured the plaintiff.
The injured plaintiff contended, as do Plaintiffs here, that a police
officer is on duty twenty-four hours a day and that he had the right and duty
to investigate a supposed accident and render assistance, even when not on
duty. For purposes of their decision, the Court assumed that contention to be
true.15 Even with that assumption, the Court declined to hold the County
liable under respondeat superior, stating:
To hold a master legally responsible for the act of
a servant who is engaged in furthering his master's
In Collier, it should also be noted that the police vehicle was used as a car
pool vehicle for four officers at the time of the accident. Collier, 362
N.Y.S.2d at 52.
15

The Court assumed this contention for purposes of argument but
specifically declined to adopt it as a statement of the law. Koscelek, 43 A.2d
at 551.
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business and who, while doing so, negligently uses
some instrumentality that carries him from place to
place, it must either be proved that the master
exercised actual or potential control over that
instrumentality, or the use of the instrumentality at
the time and place of the act complained of must
be of such vital importance in furthering the
business of the master that the latter's actual or
potential control of it at that time and place may be
reasonably inferred.
Koscelek, 43 A.2d at 551.
Salt Lake City had no more control over Ms. Ross than Allegheny
County did over their officer. In fact in Koscelek, the off-duty officer was
actually attempting to render police services. Ms. Ross was simply driving
home with her son.
In Logan v. Phillips, 891 S.W.2d 542, 544 (Missouri 1995) the Court
declined to find respondeat superior where a police officer was involved in
a fatal accident while traveling from his home to court in order to testify
pursuant to a subpoena. He was in uniform at the time of the accident.
In deciding against respondeat superior, the Court found that the
officer was not reimbursed for any traveling expenses and his pay did not
commence until he arrived at the courthouse. The Court further found that
the City did not control the officer in the operation of the vehicle, his route
or method of transportation.
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These facts are so similar to the present case as to speak volumes
against Plaintiffs' position.
Plaintiffs' reliance on Workers' Compensation and foreign case law
avail them little. To the extent that they are helpful, they demonstrate a
record that supports the non-existence of the "employex-provided
transportation" exception to the "coming and going" rule. The cases do,
however, demonstrate a clear and consistent recognition by this Court of the
"owner-required transportation" exception.
Ms. Ross was not required to use the City's vehicle and in fact had to
pay for the privilege. She was not performing any duties that benefited Salt
Lake City. She was just driving home from work, a classic example of the
"coming and going" rule. Respondeat superior liability is inappropriate
under such circumstances.
B.
MS. ROSS WAS NOT ON A "SPECIAL ERRAND"
Below, Plaintiffs argued, alternatively, that Ms. Ross was on a
"special errand" and as such, came within an exception to the "coming and
going" rule. The trial court, having concluded that Ms. Ross fell within the
"owner-provided transportation" exception, declined to address the "special
errand" exception. {See Memorandum Decision, fn. 1.) However, this
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Court may rely on any basis having support in the record to affirm the trial
court,16 so the City addresses such point herein.
In support of their "special errand" argument, Plaintiffs submit the
case of State Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission, 685 P.2d 1051
17

(Utah 1984)." In that case, the Court found that an employee who lived in
Brigham City and drove to Salt Lake City to attend job-related training was
on a special errand and, accordingly, covered by Workers' Compensation.
Plaintiffs also rely upon another Workers' Compensation case, Drake
v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177, 183 (Utah 1997) for a similar
premise.
Plaintiffs reliance on these cases belies the Court's actual holdings.
In Drake, the Court clarified the significant factor it relied upon in its State
Tax Commission holding. The Court stated: "[T]he employee in State Tax
Commission was traveling to a one-time training seminar." Drake, 939 P.2d
1 O

at 184.

Unlike the claimant in State Tax Commission, Ms. Ross's travel

was to a regularly scheduled FTO meeting and while she was paid for her
attendance at that meeting, she was not paid for her travel. See Fact Nos. 2,
16
First Security Bank of Utah v. Creech, 858 P.2d 958, 963 (Utah 1993).
Curiously, the trial court used this "special errand" case to support its
"owner-provided transportation" decision
The claimant was also provided mileage reimbursement. State Tax
Comm., 685 P.2d at 1055. Ms. Ross was not. See Facts 11 and 12, supra.
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3, 6 and 7 supra. State Tax Commission is not only a Workers'
Compensation case but factually incongruent with the negligence issues
before this Court.
Given the facts in Drake, supra, Plaintiffs' reliance thereon is even
more curious. In that matter, claimant worked in Salt Lake City but lived in
Ogden. Because the employer's regular courier service was not performing
as expected, the employer asked claimant to pick up and deliver documents
between Salt Lake and Ogden two or three days a week. Claimant was
required to take a five-to-six-mile detour in order to accomplish this task.
She was not compensated for her mileage nor was she given any overtime
compensation when her deliveries required her to work more than her
normal eight-hour work day. Drake, 939 P.2d at 179.
Notwithstanding the Court's acknowledgement that Workers'
Compensation cases resolve any doubts in favor of the claimant, the Court
denied her "special errand" claim. Drake, 939 P.2d at 182, 184. The Court
concluded that these deliveries were part of her normal duties. The Court
held that a five to six mile diversion was insignificant. Finally, the Court
correctly concluded that the risks to claimant were the very same risks to
which any member of the traveling public was subject. Drake, 939 P.2d at
184. The Court's attention is invited to the facts that Ms. Ross's travel was
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on her way home; she was traveling from a regularly scheduled meeting; she
could choose between using her personal vehicle or the City's vehicle; she
paid to use the City's vehicle; she was transporting her infant child; and
perhaps most importantly, was not, by her own admission, in furtherance of
any police business. See Fact Nos. 4, 5, 11, 14, 15, 18 and 27.
If the claimant in Drake, given her factual underpinnings and the
Workers' Compensation presumption*favoring coverage, was unable to fall
within the "special errand" exception, it is difficult to accept that Ms. Ross's
meager facts coupled with Plaintiffs' higher burden of persuasion could
meet the "special errand" requirements under a respondeat superior test.
Similarly, in VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Commission, 901 P.2d 281,
281 (Utah App. 1995) the Court held that an employee injured while en
route to work in a truck provided by his employer was not on a "special
errand" because "[the employee] was not being compensated for his time spent
traveling between his home and [the employer's] office. The accident did not
occur on [the employer's] premises, nor did [the employee's] duties require him to
be at the place where the accident occurred. The risk that caused the accident was
one common to the traveling public and was not created by duties connected with
his employment." VanLeeuwen, 901 P.2d at 285. The Court concluded, as it
did in Drake, that the risk that caused the accident was one common to all
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the traveling public and was not created by duties connected with
employment. VanLeeuwen, 901 P.2d 285.19 Such conclusions are wholly
applicable to this matter.
In Cross v. Industrial Commission, 824 P.2d 1202, 1205 (Utah App.
1992) the Court summarily disposed of a claim similar to Plaintiffs' herein:
At the time of [claimant's] accident, he was not on
an errand for his employer, or even traveling at his
employer's direction. [Claimant] was merely
traveling home from work. [Claimant's] reliance
on State Tax Commission is misguided.
Finally, in Lundberg v. Cream O Weber, 465 P.2d 174 (Utah 1970)
the Court found that although a company car was available to him, the
Plaintiffs deceased husband chose to use his own car to attend an early
morning meeting before normal work hours. In denying coverage, the Court
found that attendance at a "specially called" meeting was not an unusual
occurrence and did not make traveling to it a "special assignment or
mission." Lundberg, 465 P.2d at 176.
The Lundberg facts are remarkably similar to the instant matter and
so, too, should be the result. Ms. Ross could choose between a company car
and her personal vehicle. See Fact Nos. 11,13 and 14. She happened to
choose a City vehicle which she paid for the right to use. See Fact No. 15.
19

These "special errand" factors are substantially similar to those of the
Birkner test. See Point I, supra.
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She was traveling from a regularly scheduled meeting. See Fact No. 5. She
was not required to use a City vehicle to go to and from work. See Fact No.
12.
Nothing in Ms. Ross's facts distinguish this case from the foregoing
cases that refused to find a "special errand." Workers' Compensation cases
to the extent they are instructive at all in a negligence case, stand for the
proposition that Ms. Ross was not on a "special errand" and, accordingly,
not within the scope of her employment.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED
THE INCORRECT TESTS
While acknowledging the existence of the Birkner test, the trial court
summarily ignored its various prongs and, instead, fashioned a unique test
drawing from so-called "owner-provided transportation" exception to the
"coming and going" rule.
The trial court based its decision on three findings:
1.

Ms. Ross was driving a City vehicle that she was permitted (but

not required) to use;
2.

The City ordinance pertaining to take home vehicles; and

20

Such exception was mischaracterized and such mischaracterization led to
the trial court's erroneous result. See Point II.A., supra.
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3.

The requirement that Ms. Ross maintain certain equipment in
91

the police vehicle and monitor the police radio while driving.
None of these findings is sufficient to meet the Birkner test nor the
exceptions to the "coming and going" rule.
While it is undisputed that Ms. Ross was driving a City vehicle, that
fact, contrary to the trial court's opinion, is not determinative. As more fully
set forth in Point II. A., it is not the "providing" of the vehicle, rather the test
is whether the employer "required' the employee to use the vehicle. The
City did not require such use and the trial court's improper application of
this essential element was error.
Further, the trial court's reliance on the City's ordinance was
improper. The ordinance in question provides:
A. No motor vehicle owned by the City may be
taken home by any City employee except under
the following circumstances:
1. Written permission is granted by the mayor of
the mayor's designee on a demonstrated need
for such vehicle to be taken home to serve the
public interest. Such demonstrated need shall
be deemed to exist for the following
employees:
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In fact the trial court's oversimplification of this issue is contrary to this
Court's direction. See Drake 939 P.2d at 183 fn. 8. ("Although the control
the employer exercises and the benefit the employer receives are factors, we
do not think that either is necessarily decisive.")

(b) employees who are subject to twenty-four-hour
call.
See Memorandum Decision p. 5.
Initially, it is noted that the ordinance is permissive not mandatory,
that is, the City did not require Ms. Ross to take her City vehicle home. In
fact, it was her choice and she paid the City for the privilege. {See Fact Nos.
11,13, 14 and 15.)
In addition, the trial court presumably relied upon the ordinance
phrase ". . . to serve the public interest. .." as indicative of the benefit
bestowed upon the City. However, such reliance was improper for two
reasons.
First, the trial court made no effort to discern the extent of that
supposed benefit. In Martinson v. W-M Insurance Agency, 606 P.2d 256,
258 (Utah 1980) this Court held:
• •

[I]f the predominant motivation and purpose of the
activity is in serving the social aspect, or other
personal diversion of the employee, even though
there may be some transaction of business or
performance of duty merely incidental or
adjunctive thereto, the person should not be
deemed to be in the course of his employment and
where there is uncertainty as to the just-stated
proposition, that should be resolved by the . . . trier
of fact.
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Here the trial court made no effort to distinguish the benefits between
Ms. Ross and the City. While under most conditions that effort may be
difficult, in this matter it is not. Salt Lake City received no benefit by Ms.
Ross's commute in Tooele County. The public's interest referred to in the
ordinance refers to the interests of Salt Lake City residents, not the public
generally. Those residents derived no benefit from Ms. Ross's commute.
On the other hand, the motivation for the commute were purely personal to
Ms. Ross.
This reasoning is wholly consistent with that espoused in Whitehead,
801P.2dat937:
The major premise of the "going and coming" rule
is that it is unfair to impose unlimited liability on
an employer for conduct of its employees over
which it had no control and from which it derives
no benefit.
Liability follows benefits and when the trial court made no effort to
determine the relative benefits, it failed to properly apply the policies and
purposes behind the "coming and going" rule.
In addition, the ordinance, given the specific facts herein, is wholly
irrelevant. Salt Lake City's ordinances, including this one, are limited in
scope and effect to the jurisdictional boundaries of Salt Lake City. Piatt v.
Town ofTorrey, 949 P.2d 325, 336 (Utah 1997). The City did not, and

in

indeed could not, adopt an ordinance with the public policy finding that the
City's program was intended to benefit the residents of Tooele County. The
trial court's reliance upon this City ordinance, given the extra-territorial facts
of this case, was a material error.
The trial court also found relevance in the fact that Ms. Ross "was
required to abide by specific requirements for operating her police vehicle,
including having specified equipment in her vehicle and monitoring [sic] the
radio while driving." (See Memorandum Decision, p. 5.) The trial court did
not elucidate on the relevance of those findings but, instead merely refers to
a New Mexico case, Medina v. Fuller, 971 P.2d 851 (N.M. 1998).
The facts and law of Medina, however are so far afield from the
present matter that its value amounts to zero. In Medina, the officer was
required to take her police vehicle home. There is no evidence that she paid
for the privilege of taking it home as did Ms. Ross.
At the time of her accident, Officer Fuller, "was in her patrol unit,
with her radio on, with badge and gun, and ready to respond to calls."
Medina, 971 P.2d at 856. Ms. Ross, on the other hand had her one-year old
son in the car and under Police Department policy, was not available to
respond to a call. See Fact Nos. 18 and 20.
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In Medina, the court found that the officer "must have his unit
immediately available to him." Medina, 971 P.2d at 852. Ms. Ross did not
have such need and the choice to use a City vehicle was totally hers for
which she paid a fee. {See Fact Nos. 11, 13, 14 and 15.)
In Medina, the court found, under department policy, that Officer
Fuller, as a supervisor, was "on-call" at the time of the accident. The policy
makes it clear that not all officers are always "on-call." Medina, 971 P.2d at
852. Ms. Ross was not "on-call" and, in fact, the City has adopted a policy
whereby an "off-duty" police officer can become an "on-duty" officer. If
needed, an "off-duty" officer "shall notify the dispatcher" and when the
officer does so, the officer will "be compensated pursuant to the overtime
99

policy consistent with the Fair Labor Standards Act."

Ms. Ross had no

reason to contact dispatch and go "on-duty" for the simple reason that she
was performing no police function.
Finally, New Mexico law provides that an employee is within the
scope of employment, when, inter alia, the employee's conduct, "did not
arise entirely from some external, independent and personal motive on the
part of the employee. {Medina, 971 P.2d at 856.) Contrariwise, in Utah, the
standard is very different. See Martinson, 606 P.2d at 258 ("if the
22
See excerpts form Take Home Car Program Policy D33-02—00.00 et seq.
attached hereto as Addendum 2.

predominant motivation and purpose of the activity is in serving the social
aspect, or other personal diversion of the employee, even though there may
be some transaction of business or performance of duty merely incidental or
adjunctive thereto, the person should not be deemed to be in the course of
employment.") Ms. Ross fits squarely within Martinson and, for that reason
and the others set forth herein, reliance upon Medina was not only
unnecessary, it was erroneous.23
The trial court's efforts to fashion a test, to the exclusion of the
existing and appropriate tests was error.

23

Medina, in any event appears an aberration among the states. See Evans v.
Dixie Fasteners, 162 Ga.App. 74, 290 S.E.2d 172, 174 (1982) (Being on call
24 hours a day does not necessarily mean employee was in the service of his
employer when collision occurred); Herndon v. Neal, 424 S.2d 1180, 1182
(La.Ct.App. 1982) (An informal "on call" situation does not mean the
employee is within the course and scope of his employment every second of
every day); Clickner v. City of Lowell, 422 Mass. 539, 663 N.E.2d 852, 855
(1996) (The mere fact of being on call does not place employees within the
scope of their employment); Ehlenfieldv. State, 62 A.D.2d 1151, 404
N.Y.2d 649, 408 N.Y.S.2d 1023, 380 N.E.2d 336 (The fact that an employee
is constantly "on call" is not sufficient to cast his employer in liability);
Hantke v. Harris Mack Works, 152 Or. 564, 54 P.2d 293, 296 (1936) (The
mere fact that an employee is on call does not render his employer liable);
Melnickv.Neuman, 104 Wis.2d 744, 314N.W.2d 363 (App. 1981) (The fact
that an employee is on call is merely one factor to be considered by the trier
of fact in determining whether an employee is within or outside the scope of
his employment.
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CONCLUSION
Two valid judicial tests exist to evaluate "scope of employment"
issues - the Birkner test and the "coming and going" rule. The trial court
acknowledged these tests but did not apply the facts of this case to either
test. Preferring to fashion its own test, the trial court failed to go through the
proper analysis and ended up with a draconian and erroneous result - a
police officer is always on duty when in a police car.
This result defies the facts in this specific case and creates an allencompassing rule of law contrary to the very dictates of this Court. The
trial court's decision was incorrect and should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted this ZH

day of January, 2002.

Chief Deputy City. Attorney
Attorney for Appellant Salt Lake City
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AHLSTROM,
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Plaintiffs,

Case No. 000906066
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI

vs
Court Clerk: Janet Banks
September 17, 2001
MICHELLE S. ROSS and SALT LAKE
CITY CORPORATION,
Defendants

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Court heard oral argument with

respect to both motions on August 6, 2001.

Following the hearing,

the matters were taken under advisement.
The Court having considered the motions, memoranda, exhibits
attached thereto and for the good cause shown hereby enters the
following ruling.
The parties in this matter were involved in an auto accident
which

occurred

in

Tooele

County.

Defendant,

("Officer Ross") , is a Salt Lake City police
driving her police vehicle home
("FTO") meeting.

Michelle

officer

from a field training

and

Ross
was

officer

Officer Ross' one year old son was in the car

with her at the time.

AHLSTROM v. ROSS

Page 2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

The issue with respect to these motions is whether the City's
liability is limited to what it owes as an insurer of the vehicle
driven by Officer Ross or if the City is vicariously liable for all
of plaintiffs' damages as

Ross's employer.

The issue turns on

whether Officer Ross was acting within the course and scope of her
employment at the time of the accident in question.

Both parties

agree it is a general rule that an employee is not acting within
the course and scope of her employment when she is going or coming
home from work.

See Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance

Co., 801 P.2d 934 (Utah 1989).
In support of their motion, plaintiffs note there are two
exceptions to the general rule which apply here.

First, plaintiffs

argue Officer Ross was on a "special errand" and required to attend
the FTO meeting.

According to plaintiffs, it is well settled that

where an employee is injured while traveling to or from a special
mission, as distinguished from going to or coming home from his
regular place of work, he is within the protection of the Worker's
Compensation

Act.

Next, assert

plaintiffs,

Officer

Ross

was

driving the employer owned vehicle for the benefit of her employer,
the

City.

Indeed,

argue

plaintiffs,

the

City

ordinance

specifically finds the vehicle will be taken home to serve the
public interest.
Defendants oppose the motion and support their own motion for

li

.<-
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summary judgment arguing the cases cited by plaintiffs in support
of

their

motion

are

Worker's

Compensation

cases

and

situations, the presumption favors the injured employee.
assert
cases.

defendants, no

such presumption

attaches

in

in

such

However,

negligence

Further,

argue defendants, Officer Ross was not on a

"special errand."

Indeed, contend defendants, this was a regularly

scheduled meeting and was not an unusual occurrence.

Moreover, as

for any benefit to the City, defendants argue Officer Ross was not
pursuing any police business at the time of the accident, did not
know how to contact the Tooele County emergency dispatch, was not
required to use the City vehicle and was driving home with her
infant

child-which

under the City's policy precluded

her

from

taking any calls until the child was taken to safety.
Finally, defendants cite to the case of Birkner v. Salt Lake
County, 771 P.2d 1053, in which the Court set forth the following
factors attendant to a finding of scope of employment:
[I]n general the servant's conduct is within
the scope of his employment if it is of the
kind which he is employed to perform, occurs
substantially within the authorized limits of
time and space, and is actuated, at least in
part, by a purpose to serve the master.

Id. at 1056-57.
In the instant case, assert defendants, none of these factors
applies to Officer Ross at the time of the accident.
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Summary judgment is appropriate only if no genuine issue of
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).

"In considering a

summary judgment motion, the Court must evaluate all the evidence
and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in the
light most

favorable

to the party

opposing

summary

judgment."

Cinder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., 739 P.2d 634, 634 (Utah Ct. App.
1987) .
As noted, in this case, there is no dispute regarding the
general rule that an employee is not acting within the course and
scope of her employment when she is going or coming home from work.
See Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., 801 P.2d 934
(Utah 1989) .

Further, although the parties take issue with their

applicability, neither side disputes the existence of the "owner
provided transportation'' and "special errand'' exceptions to the
general rule.
Turning first to the owner provided transportation exception,
in Whitehead, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the going and
coming rule does not apply "where transportation was furnished by
the employer to benefit the employer. . . " 685 P.2d at 1053.
Applying this to the instant case, there is no dispute Officer Ross
was driving a police vehicle and that she was permitted to drive
such vehicle to and from work.

Moreover, pursuant

to Chapter

AHLSTROM v. ROSS
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Salt Lake City Code, Ross' use of the City's

vehicle was a benefit to the City.

That ordinance specifically

provides:
A.

No motor vehicle owned by the City may be
taken home by any City employee except
under the following circumstances:

1.

Written permission is granted by the
mayor or the mayor's designee on a
demonstrated need for such vehicle to be
taken home to serve the public interest.
Such demonstrated need shall be deemed to
exist for the following employees:

(b)

employees who are subject to twenty-fourhour call.

The aforementioned, combined with the fact that Officer Ross
was required to abide by specific requirements for operating her
police vehicle, including having specified equipment in the vehicle
and monitoring the radio while driving, makes clear Officer Ross
was acting within the scope of her employment while driving home in
her assigned police car.
(N.M. App. 1998) .

See Medina v. Fuller, 971 P.2d 851, 857

Finally, because Officer Ross can be called to

duty by the mere happening
essentially

always

of events in her presence, she is

on duty, at

least

when

operating

a police

vehicle.
Based upon the forgoing, the Court is persuaded the City is
directly

benefitted

Officer

Ross7

use

of

the

City

vehicle.

Accordingly, the Court finds her travel was within the course and

1. .i
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See Collier v. County of Nassau, 3 62

N.Y.S.2d 52 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1974).

Consequently, plaintiff's

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted and defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment, respectfully, denied.1
DATED this

//y

day of September, 2001.

11

G££NN K. IWASAKI l^V ?!^^"/ /
DISTRICT COURT J U D 0 £ ^ S , J ^ ^ /

x

Based upon this finding, the Court does not reach the
special errand exception.

Ki-

Case No. 000906066
C e r t i f i c a t e of Mailing
I c e r t i f y t h a t on the 18th day of September, 2001, I sent by
f i r s t c l a s s mail a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of the a t t a c h e d document
to the following:
M. DAVID ECKERSLEY
CITY CENTRE I, SUITE 900
175 EAST 400 SOUTH
SLC, UTAH 84111
STEVEN W. ALLRED
451 SOUTH STATE, SUITE 505
SLC, UTAH 84111

D i s t r i c t Court Clerk

Deputy Clerk

**Individuals with disabilities needing special accommodations during this
proceeding should call (801)238-7300, at least three working days prior to
the proceeding.
TDD phone for hearing impaired, (801)238-7391.

Addendum 2

EXCERPTS FROM TAKE-HOME CAR POLICY
7.
When using the vehicle, off-duty employees must keep the
police radio on an, if necessary, be available to respond to emergency calls.
If in the vicinity, the officer should respond to in-progress crimes or other
major calls. The officer shall notify the dispatcher of the response and
should continue to assist until relieved or until the problem is concluded.
Passengers should not be in police vehicles while responding to
emergencies or dangerous calls. They should be left in a safe place prior to
arrival at the scene.
8.
If an off-duty officer responds to a dispatched call or performs
other police services as discussed in paragraph 6 [sic] above1, the officer will
be compensated pursuant to the overtime policy consistent with the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

1

In 1999, another section of the policy was modified but the numbering was not correlated. Paragraph 6
deals with dress codes and the reference to paragraph 6 in paragraph 8 is clearly incorrect. In context, the
reference to paragraph 6 in paragraph 8 clearly was meant to refer to paragraph 7.

Addendum 3

10-3-914 Police officers -Authority.

(1) Within the boundaries of the municipality, police officers have the
same authority as deputy sheriffs, including at all times the authority to
preserve the public peace, prevent crime, detect and arrest offenders,
suppress riots, protect persons and property, remove nuisances existing in
the public streets, roads, and highways, enforce every law relating to the
suppression of offenses, and perform all duties required of them by
ordinance or resolution.
(2) This section is not a limitation of a police officer's statewide authority as
otherwise provided by law.

53-13-103 Law enforcement officer.

(1) (a) "Law enforcement officer" means a sworn and certified peace officer
who is an employee of a law enforcement agency that is part of or
administered by the state or any of its political subdivisions, and whose
primary and principal duties consist of the prevention and detection of crime
and the enforcement of criminal statutes or ordinances of this state or any of
its political subdivisions.
(b) "Law enforcement officer" specifically includes the following:
(i) any sheriff or deputy sheriff, chief of police, police officer, or marshal of
any county, city, or town;
(ii) the commissioner of public safety and any member of the Department of
Public Safety certified as a peace officer;
(iii) all persons specified in Sections 23-20-1.5 and 63-11-17.2;
(iv) any police officer employed by any college or university;
(v) investigators for the Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division;
(vi) special agents or investigators employed by the attorney general, district
attorneys, and county attorneys;
(vii) employees of the Department of Natural Resources designated as peace
officers by law;
(viii) school district police officers as designated by the board of education
for the school district;
(ix) the executive director of the Department of Corrections and any
correctional enforcement or investigative officer designated by the executive

director and approved by the commissioner of public safety and certified by
the division;
(x) correctional enforcement, investigative, or adult probation and parole
officers employed by the Department of Corrections serving on or before
July 1, 1993;
(xi) members of a law enforcement agency established by a private college
or university provided that the college or university has been certified by the
commissioner of public safety according to rules of the Department of
Public Safety; and
(xii) airport police officers of any airport owned or operated by the state or
any of its political subdivisions.
(2) Law enforcement officers may serve criminal process and arrest violators
of any law of this state and have the right to require aid in executing their
lawful duties.
(3) (a) A law enforcement officer has statewide full-spectrum peace
officer authority, but the authority extends to other counties, cities, or
towns only when the officer is acting under Title 77, Chapter 9, Uniform
Act on Fresh Pursuit, unless the law enforcement officer is employed by
the state.
(b) (i) A local law enforcement agency may limit the jurisdiction in which its
law enforcement officers may exercise their peace officer authority to a
certain geographic area.
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (3)(b)(i), a law enforcement officer may
exercise his authority outside of the limited geographic area, pursuant to
Title 77, Chapter 9, Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit, if the officer is pursuing
an offender for an offense that occurred within the limited geographic area.
(c) The authority of law enforcement officers employed by the Department
of Corrections is regulated by Title 64, Chapter 13, Department of
Corrections —State Prison.
(4) A law enforcement officer shall, prior to exercising peace officer
authority, satisfactorily complete:
(a) the basic course at a certified law enforcement officer training academy
or pass a certification examination as provided in Section 53-6- 206, and be
certified; and
(b) annual certified training of at least 40 hours per year as directed by the
director of the division, with the advice and consent of the council.

77-9-3 Authority of peace officer of this state beyond normal jurisdiction.

(1) Any peace officer authorized by any governmental entity of this state
may exercise a peace officer's authority beyond the limits of such
officer's normal jurisdiction as follows:
(a) when in fresh pursuit of an offender for the purpose of arresting and
holding that person in custody or returning the suspect to the
jurisdiction where the offense was committed;
(b) when a public offense is committed in such officer's presence;
(c) when participating in an investigation of criminal activity which
originated in the officer's normal jurisdiction in cooperation with the
local authority; or
(d) when called to assist peace officers of another jurisdiction.
(2) (a) Any peace officer, prior to taking any action authorized by
Subsection (1), shall notify and receive approval of the local law
enforcement authority, or if the prior contact is not reasonably possible,
notify the local law enforcement authority as soon as reasonably possible,
(b) Unless specifically requested to aid a peace officer of another jurisdiction
or otherwise as provided for by law, no legal responsibility for a peace
officer's action outside his normal jurisdiction, except as provided in this
section, shall attach to the local law enforcement authority.

